

The background is a deep red color. Overlaid on it is a network diagram consisting of several white circles connected by thin white lines. The circles are arranged in a non-uniform, interconnected pattern. Additionally, there are numerous out-of-focus, circular light spots in shades of orange and yellow, creating a bokeh effect across the entire cover.

# GOVERNANCE NETWORKS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

ERIK HANS KLIJN AND JOOP KOPPENJAN

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The Routledge logo, which is a stylized white silhouette of a person's head and shoulders, facing right.

# Governance Networks in the Public Sector

*Governance Networks in the Public Sector* presents a comprehensive study of governance networks and the management of complexities in network settings. Public, private and non-profit organizations are increasingly faced with complex, wicked problems when making decisions, developing policies, or delivering services in the public sector. These activities take place in networks of interdependent actors guided by diverging and sometimes conflicting perceptions and strategies. As a result these networks are dominated by cognitive, strategic, and institutional complexities. Dealing with these complexities requires sophisticated forms of coordination: network governance.

This book presents the most recent theoretical and empirical insights into governance networks. It provides a conceptual framework and analytical tools to study the complexities involved in handling wicked problems in governance networks in the public sector. The book also discusses strategies and management recommendations for governments, business, and third sector organizations operating in and governing networks.

*Governance Networks in the Public Sector* is an essential text for advanced students of public management, public administration, public policy, and political science, and for public managers and policymakers.

**Erik Hans Klijn** is Professor of Public Administration at Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands. His research focuses on topics like network management, the role of trust, public–private partnerships, democratic legitimacy, the influence of media attention, and branding.

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'The latest text from Klijn and Koppenjan addresses the enduring topic of networks comprehensively and convincingly. While research on governance networks has made great strides over the past few decades, this outstanding text succeeds in summarizing what is known about networks as well as anticipating what will be important in the future.'

– *Professor Michael McGuire, Indiana University, USA*

'This book is the most comprehensive consideration of governance networks available, systematically spanning its theoretical foundations and providing strategies and practical guidelines for analysing and managing networks. The authors also provide new overviews of governance networks' democratic legitimacy, accountability mechanisms, and evaluation processes. Academics, students, and practitioners will all find this an extremely useful reference.'

– *Professor Jenny M Lewis, The University of Melbourne, Australia*

'Twenty years in the making, this book is the definitive manual on how to analyze, manage, and assess governance networks.'

– *Professor Rod A. W. Rhodes, University of Southampton, UK*

# Governance Networks in the Public Sector

Erik Hans Klijn and Joop Koppenjan

First published 2016  
by Routledge  
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

And by Routledge  
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business*

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*British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data*

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data*

Klijn, Erik-Hans.

Governance networks in the public sector / Erik Hans Klijn and Joop Koppenjan.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Intergovernmental cooperation. 2. Interagency coordination.  
I. Koppenjan, Johannes Franciscus Maria, 1955– II. Title.  
JC355.K57 2016  
352.1—dc23  
2015006861

ISBN: 978-0-415-70699-5 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-415-70701-5 (pbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-88709-8 (ebk)

Typeset in Goudy  
by Apex CoVantage, LLC

# Contents

<i>List of figures</i>	vii
<i>List of tables</i>	viii
<i>List of boxes</i>	x
<i>Preface</i>	xii
1 Governance networks in the public sector: an introduction	1
<b>PART I</b>	
<b>Governance networks</b>	19
2 An intellectual history of networks	21
3 Substantive complexity in governance networks: multiple perceptions and contested knowledge	40
4 Strategic complexity in governance networks: strategies, games, rounds, and arenas	66
5 The institutional complexity of governance networks: patterns, rules, and trust	98
<b>PART II</b>	
<b>Network management</b>	123
6 Managing substantive complexities in governance networks	125
7 Managing strategic complexity in governance networks	152
8 Managing institutional complexities in governance networks	182

**PART III**

**Normative issues in governance networks** 205

9 Governance networks and democracy 207

10 Governance networks and accountability 223

11 Evaluating governance networks 240

**PART IV**

**Synthesis and reflection** 257

12 Analyzing governance networks 259

13 Wrapping things up and looking ahead: towards  
a New Public Governance? 289

*References* 313

*Index* 339

# Figures

3.1	Multiple perceptions of a problem situation	47
3.2	The relationship between knowledge production and the interaction process	63
4.1	Strategies as goal–means combinations based on perceptions	79
4.2	The policy game as a mix of strategies (game types) that actors bring to the arena	84
4.3	Rounds in the governance network process	87
4.4	The governance network process as interactions in various arenas	91
4.5	The coupling between arenas and processes	93
6.1	Traditional policymaking and creative competition compared	132
6.2	The relation between research activities and the problem-solving process	145
6.3	Concurrent research: the loose coupling between the arenas of research and negotiation	149
12.1	Strategic information network for Copenhagen	284
13.1	Theoretical framework: factors explaining governance networks processes	308



# Tables

1.1	Three dominant perspectives in public administration	9
2.1	Types of networks in empirical research and their characteristics	23
3.1	Four types of problems	43
3.2	Complicated versus complex problems	64
4.1	A phase model of policymaking	69
4.2	Policymaking as an analytical activity versus a social interaction process	71
4.3	Typology of dependency relations between actors	75
5.1	Institutional and process characteristics of networks	106
5.2	Two logics of action	107
5.3	Types of institutional theory	108
5.4	Types of rules in networks	114
6.1	Traditional and network approaches to managing substantive complexity	127
7.1	Process characteristics and requirements for process management	155
7.2	Process management as process design: making agreements about the rules of the game	170
8.1	Strategies for influencing and changing rules in networks	187
9.1	Four conjectures on the relationship of governance networks to democratic institutions	210
9.2	Sources of democratic legitimacy in representative democracy and governance networks	220
9.3	Criteria for democratic legitimacy	222
10.1	Types of accountability that governance networks may face	230
10.2	Two designs of political accountability mechanisms for governance networks	237
11.1	Assessment criteria for governance network processes	255
12.1	Steps in actor, game, and institutional analysis	261
12.2	Three viewpoints on the relationship between media and governance	266
12.3	Summarizing the perceptions	267
12.4	Analyzing dependencies between actors	269

12.5	Dependencies of a specific actor	270
12.6	Interaction frequencies between actors	281
12.7	Measurement of trust	285
13.1	Theoretical and normative assumptions of the governance network approach	291
13.2	Principles underlying the management of complexity: two approaches	295
13.3	Managing substantive complexity	296
13.4	Managing strategic complexity	298
13.5	Managing institutional complexity	299
13.6	Assessment criteria for governance networks and their processes	302
13.7	Factors that explain the evolution and outcomes of governance network processes	303

# Boxes

1.1	The debates on hydraulic fracturing as wicked problems	2
1.2	Dealing with multiple problem clients in youth care as a wicked problem	3
1.3	Comparing Traditional Public Administration, New Public Management, and the governance network perspective	9
2.1	Social network theory	24
3.1	Wind farm wars: the debate on wind energy as wicked problem	43
3.2	Perceptions in home care	47
3.3	Perceptions on the construction of wind farms	48
3.4	Framing in the wind farm wars	51
3.5	Attracting media attention: surfing along with the media logic	53
3.6	Framing and storytelling in the discourse on the quality of elder care in The Netherlands	56
3.7	The nature of the discourse on wind energy	57
3.8	Knowledge uncertainty in the wind farm wars: fights over facts	60
4.1	Examples of strategic complexity in governance network processes	67
4.2	Lindblom's incrementalism	71
4.3	Types of resources in governance networks	74
4.4	Actors, resources, and interdependencies in the case of the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository	77
4.5	Actors, perceptions, and strategies in the case of the Fehmarnbelt tunnel	81
4.6	Arenas in the case of the Dalian PX protest in China	82
4.7	NIMBY protest as game type	85
4.8	How to recognize crucial decisions	86
4.9	Rounds in the decision making on the extension of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol	88
4.10	The linking up of strategic games: the Dalian PX protests	91
4.11	The coupling of arenas and interaction processes	93
4.12	Outcomes in the Amsterdam Airport Schiphol case	96
5.1	The role of the media as an additional source of complexity	100
5.2	The maturing of a network	103

5.3	Language as an example of rule-driven behaviour	105
5.4	Trust enhances network performance	117
6.1	The Rebuild by Design competition in the New York/ New Jersey region as an example of creative competition	132
6.2	Joint commissioning of research in the Dutch zinc debate	148
7.1	Managing strategic complexity in wind farm initiatives: involving local actors	158
7.2	Process management in the Goodna Service Integration Project, Queensland, Australia	170
7.3	Managing the Sacramento Water Forum process, California, USA	175
7.4	Process management in contracting home care services in Rotterdam, The Netherlands	179
8.1	Public-private partnerships: an institutional design for a governance network	183
8.2	Creating new actors: PFI in road provision in the UK	189
8.3	PPP: changing the reward rules	191
8.4	Changing professional codes in the Rotterdam Urban Renewal project	192
8.5	Changing the EU stance on fiscal policy	194
8.6	Public-private partnerships as sensitizing concept	199
9.1	The empirical effect of the three sources of democratic legitimacy on effectiveness	219
11.1	An example of a win-win situation	249
11.2	Assessing two governance network processes	254
12.1	Q methodology: analyzing managers' opinions about the role of the media	265
12.2	Three examples of process analyses	274
12.3	Example of a social network analysis	282
12.4	Measuring trust in networks through a survey	285
12.5	An analysis of the rules governing the urban renewal network in Rotterdam	287

# Preface

Governance networks have assumed even greater importance in public administration practice, research, and theory since 2004, when we wrote our previous book *Managing Uncertainties in Networks*. At that time it was possible to read most of the network literature. Currently for students and young academics delving into the world of governance networks this is an almost impossible undertaking. Remarkably, despite the surge in publications on networks, comprehensive text books on governance networks in the public sector are hard to find. Most of the books that are available are edited volumes, often addressing researchers rather than students and practitioners. Consequently, a text book like this, which provides a comprehensive theoretical perspective on dealing with wicked problems in policymaking and service delivery in governance networks, is both necessary and useful. The book is aimed at a wide and international audience, but it is especially written for students in public administration, public management, public planning, and policy sciences and analysis.

Wishing to serve this audience, we started working on a new edition of our 2004 book. Soon, we realized that, although we were building upon texts and ideas from that book, we were actually writing a new book, which for various reasons should also have a new title. Most importantly, we thought that the title of the 2004 book did not fit the broader scope of the new book; nor did it address the audience and the topics that we now wanted to put centre stage. The earlier book dealt with decision making and uncertainty, and we wanted to widen the scope to public policymaking and public service delivery, actually writing a text book on governance networks in the public sector, which in our view was missing. Whereas the 2004 book was intended for both researchers and students, we thought that this new book should primarily address students. This, we felt, required the text to be written in a more accessible way, paying more attention to explaining the basic concepts of the governance network approach. Of course, we hope that the new text is still of interest to our colleague network researchers. Given our international orientation, the examples in the book are drawn from countries all over the world.

This book, furthermore, contains various subjects and chapters that were not included in the previous book, thus expanding its scope. We thought it important to describe the historical foundation of governance network theory. This resulted

in Chapter 2, presenting the intellectual history of the network approach. Also, we considered it essential to address developments in our thinking by introducing chapters on normative issues involved in governance networks and network management, notably on the democratic legitimacy of networks (Chapter 9), the accountability of networks (Chapter 10), and network evaluation (Chapter 11).

This book provides the reader with a systematic theoretical governance network perspective on problem solving, policymaking, and service delivery in the public sector. It provides a conceptual framework to address and understand the complexities of networks in our current society. It includes ways to identify and analyze networks and offers strategies on how to operate in networks and to manage them. It taps into a wide variety of literature on networks (but also broader public administration theories) to construct that theoretical perspective, and it covers, as we see it, most (if not all) aspects of networks that have been dealt with in the literature.

We hope that this book will find its way to practitioners, students, and network scholars.

We want to thank the undergraduate, graduate, and Ph.D. students of various Dutch and international education programmes at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, and elsewhere for the inspiring and sometimes critical discussions that we had with them on the topics raised in the 2004 book. These served as a valuable input for this new book. We also want to thank all the researchers with whom we worked and wrote during the past 10 years and who have contributed to the new ideas which are part of this book. We would like to express our gratitude to Catherine O'Dea for all her work on the linguistic editing of the manuscript.

Erik Hans especially wants to thank the following people who co-authored articles, books, and book chapters with him. In Rotterdam (mostly Erasmus University, Department of Public Administration): Erik Braun (Faculty of Economics), Arwin van Buuren, Jurian Edelenbos, Jasper Eshuis, Marcel van Gils, Michiel Kort, Iris Korthagen, Ingmar van Meerkerk, Martijn van der Steen, Bram Steijn, Geert Teisman, Mark van Twist, Brenda Vermeeren, Stefan Verwey, Steven van de Walle. Outside Rotterdam: Evan Berman (Victoria University, Wellington, NZ), Tony Bovaird (Birmingham University, UK), Don Chen (National Chengchi University, Taiwan), Stephen Jeffares (Birmingham University, UK), Lasse Gerrits (Bamberg University, Germany), Michael Hughes (Birmingham University, UK), Daniel Kubler (University of Zurich, Switzerland), Jenny Lewis (University of Melbourne, Australia), Filippe de Rynck (Ghent University, Belgium), Vicenta Sierra (Esade, Barcelona), Chris Skelcher (Birmingham University, UK), Eva Sørensen (Roskilde University, Denmark), Helen Sullivan (Melbourne University, Australia), Tamyko Ysa (Esade, Barcelona, Spain), Joris Voets (Ghent University, Belgium).

Joop would like to thank the following colleagues who inspired him and with whom he has published. In The Netherlands: former colleagues in the Faculty of Technology, Policy, and Management at the Delft University of Technology, more especially Hans de Bruijn, Bertien Broekhans, Bert Enserink, Ernst ten Heuvelhof, Martin de Jong, Mirjam Kars, Martijn Leijten, Igor Mayer, Bauke

Steenhuisen; Wil Thissen, Haiko van der Voort, Wijnand Veeneman; colleagues in the Department of Public Administration, Erasmus University: Arwin van Buuren, Jurian Edelenbos, Harry Geerlings, Yanwei Li, Ingmar van Meerkerk, Vincent Homburg, Danny Schippers, Stefan Verwey, William Voorberg; and furthermore: Niki Frantzeskaki and Derk Loorbach (Drift), Ineke Meijer (AT Osborne), Marco Hekkert (Universiteit Utrecht), Nicolette van Gestel (Tilburg University), Hans Hufen (QApplus) and Jules Verlaan (TU Delft); Outside The Netherlands: Kerry Brown and Neal Ryan (Carlton University, Australia), Lasse Gerrits (University of Bamberg, Germany), Robyn Keast and Michael Charles (Southern Cross University, Australia), Chris Koliba (University of Vermont, USA), Myrna Mandell (State University of California, USA), Jacob Torfing, Eva Sørensen, Peter Triantafillou (Roskilde University, Denmark), Tony Bovaird (University of Birmingham, UK), Bao Xi, Youngchi Ma, Rui Mu, Huang-ming Wang and Yi Liu (Dalian University of Technology, China), and Haitao Zheng (Harbin Institute of Technology, China).

# 1 Governance networks in the public sector

## An introduction

### 1.1 Introduction: governance networks as the answer to complexity

Government, business, and civil society in our contemporary network society are increasingly faced with complex societal problems. Attempts to deal with these problems may result in enduring processes of policymaking, policy implementation, and public service delivery that are hard to manage. Many examples can be given of such complex governance processes:

- Complex decision-making processes in relation to realizing, operating, and maintaining public infrastructural works (like railways, roads, airports, water projects, waste incinerators, power plants, and wind turbine parks) in which governments are confronted with a wide variety of stakeholders (private firms, citizens' groups, other public actors, environmental interest groups, and so on).
- Restructuration processes of inner cities in which municipalities need to work together with non-profit organizations (like housing associations), private actors (developers) and citizens' groups.
- Attempts at developing policies and achieving outcomes in fighting crime and improving social security that require coordinated efforts by various governmental organizations like the police, justice departments, emergency services, information bureaus, but also the involvement of private sector organizations and citizens, and collaboration between various layers of government and among nation states.
- Organizing integrated healthcare and social services for older people, which requires close cooperation between various health, welfare, social, and housing organizations that may be public, private, or non-profit, financed by, for instance, government or insurance companies.
- Processes of policy implementation or law enforcement, for instance in the food industry where governments try to regulate complex food production chains, in which various parties under conditions of competition may trade off food safety against other values.
- Processes aimed at preventing and managing large-scale accidents, crises, natural disasters, or large-scale social disturbances and their aftermaths, like



## 2 Introduction

the Hurricane Katrina disaster in New Orleans, the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, large-scale power blackouts, or outbreaks of epidemics like Ebola, that require coordination in order to create resilient networks.

These examples have in common that they involve difficult issues that require in-depth knowledge on their nature and possible solutions; they also, however, involve many actors, and this may result in a chaotic process with unexpected and unwanted outcomes, or in a process that becomes stuck in enduring and intense debates and conflicts that are not easily resolved. To say it differently: these problems are characterized by a high degree of wickedness (Rittel and Webber 1973; Radford 1977; Mason and Mitroff 1981). Thus, the wicked nature of these problems is not only caused by the lack of information or knowledge or the technologically advanced nature of the issue; but probably even more by the presence of various actors, with diverging or even conflicting interests and perceptions.

A further feature of these issues is that they cut across the traditional jurisdictions of organizations, divisions of responsibilities between layers of government (local, regional, national, supranational), and the boundaries between the public, private, and societal domains.

In Box 1.1 and Box 1.2, two examples of wicked problems with which governments are confronted are discussed in more detail: the worldwide debates on hydraulic fracturing that requires action from governments, and the challenges that youth care agencies encounter when providing help to so-called multiple problem clients.

### **Box 1.1 The debates on hydraulic fracturing as wicked problems**

The shale gas revolution that occurred in the USA and Canada from the 1990s onwards has resulted in initiatives in many countries to introduce hydraulic fracturing (also known as fracking). It has also led to conflicts among gas and oil industries proposing projects and influencing governments to adopt favourable policies, and local protestors and environmental groups that fear the environmental impact and require local and national governments to come up with strict regulations or even a ban on these practices. These debates are going on in various countries in governance networks at state and federal governmental levels over policies to be adapted or changed, and at the local and regional level regarding specific projects.

Shale gas is obtained by drilling and creating cracks in deep-rock formations through which natural gas, petroleum, and brine are released. In the course of time, new techniques have been introduced, such as horizon drilling and hydraulic fracturing. Hydraulic fracturing implies the injection of a high pressure fluid, usually chemicals, and sand suspended in water, into a wellbore, in order to create cracks. Applying these techniques on a massive scale (high volume fracturing) has increased the commercial success of this

way of exploiting fossil energy sources, to such a level that, in the USA, a shale gas revolution has been claimed. In 2012, shale gas made up 39% of US national gas production.

The technique is highly controversial though. Proponents extol the economic benefits in terms of increased employment, competitive advantages for chemical industries, and geopolitical advantages (such as the USA becoming independent from the oil producing countries). Opponents express concerns about contamination of ground water, depletion of fresh water, emission of methane, triggering of earthquakes, noise and surface pollution, and falling property prices. Research on these topics is far from conclusive, and concerns have been raised about studies funded either by pro-fracturing foundations and corporations or by environmental groups, bringing the independence of studies in doubt. Researchers and media in the US have reported difficulty in doing studies and reporting on the results because of industry and governmental pressure.

Whereas the attitude of governments towards fracturing in for instance the USA and China is positive, some countries have restricted it, and others have banned it temporarily, awaiting results of investigations, or altogether, as France did in 2011. The European Union is drafting regulations for risk management in industries applying hydraulic fracturing (Carr et al. 2011; Heikkilä et al. 2014; Wikipedia 2014b).

### **Box 1.2 Dealing with multiple problem clients in youth care as a wicked problem**

Public services are rarely isolated. Quality is only achieved in connection with other services. When a youngster is referred to youth care services, there may be a background of problems at school, at home, with the law, and with psychiatric conditions, all intertwined in a way that is impossible to disentangle. If they are to achieve any result, the different care providers need to cooperate. Integration and connectivity, in other words, are important preconditions. The various existing public service delivery institutions (for instance schools, youth care, neighbourhood workers, police, justice departments) traditionally focus on their core activities and have difficulty dealing with these transboundary problems. In various countries, centres are established for youth care, as front offices for these clients, to enhance collaboration. They may be regarded as an attempt to achieve network governance. These centres seek to improve cooperation between professionals and their institutions, and thereby make youth care more accessible and better aligned to demand. This has benefits for youngsters with more than one problem. The envisioned cooperation between care providers, however, has not been automatically successful as a result of these centres.

Authorities, often local authorities, often lack the expertise to know who should coordinate what, with whom, and when. The youth care centres struggle with their dual role – they are supposed to provide guidance in the care chain as a whole, as well as cooperate as one partner with other partners. This makes it more difficult for them to allow other care providers sufficient freedom to act and gain their trust. Moreover, the various care providers are not always on the same team as it were: they may also be competitors when it comes to scarce resources (Lemaire and Provan 2009; Koppenjan 2012).

Governments, businesses, and civil society are often unable to tackle these issues by themselves because they lack the resources or problem-solving capacities to do so. The complexity of these issues and interdependencies between actors result in intensive interactions between actors. As a result, governance networks emerge: networks of enduring patterns of social relations between actors involved in dealing with a problem, policy, or public service (Marin and Mayntz 1991; Thompson et al. 1991; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Kickert et al. 1997).

As a consequence, traditional methods of dealing with problems, policymaking, and public service delivery – which often hold complex issues to be an intellectual design question, and approach them by giving research and expertise a central role and assigning them to specialized units within hierarchical organized bureaucracies – no longer suffice. The wicked problems that confront governments, private companies, and societal groups in the current complex society require a different, new approach (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Coyne 2005; Head 2008; Weber and Khademian 2008; Hoppe 2011). They require a shift from a more traditional top-down way of problem solving to a more horizontal cooperative approach, which is often referred to as the shift from government to governance (Pierre and Peters 2000; Sørensen and Torfing 2007; Osborne 2010; Klijn and Koppenjan 2012).

### 1.2 Government, governance, and governance networks: a conceptual clarification

Although many authors acknowledge the importance of governance, it is not easy to determine what exactly is meant by it. Various authors use this term in different ways (Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1996; Pierre and Peters 2000; Frederickson 2005; Osborne 2006; Sørensen and Torfing 2007). In this section, we seek to clarify what actually is meant by it and present the definition that we use in this book. We start by specifying what we understand by *government*.

#### **Government: the Traditional Public Administration Model**

*Government* refers to public problem solving, policymaking, and service delivery according to the Traditional Public Administration Model that dominated the public administration practice in many countries all over the world for a large part

of the twentieth century (Hughes 2012; Koppenjan 2012). Its success resulted in the rise of the welfare state in Western countries, and, in particular, the bureaucratic organization of the governmental apparatus was copied worldwide. In this model, problems, policies, and services are assigned to specialized governmental units. Integration and coordination is realized by command and control within the bureaucracy, characterized by task differentiation and procedures. Within Western democracies, the political decisions regarding problems, policies, and services are taken by elected administrators at the top of the bureaucracies, who in turn are held accountable by representative bodies of elected politicians (parliaments, councils, and so on). These political decisions are implemented in a neutral way by civil servants who follow rules and ideally are inspired by a motivation to serve the public interest. The governmental apparatus is professionalized and aimed at the production of effective policies and services doing justice to the principles of equality, legitimacy, and legality. Complexities are dealt with by deconstructing them and assigning tasks to specialized units, in which they are processed as intellectual design challenges with the input of policy analysts, professionals, and scientific knowledge.

The success of this model has resulted in an ever-increasing number of tasks, personnel, organizational units, and budgets, gradually resulting in the problem of 'Big Government,' with problems in relation to controlling budgets, motivating civil servants, coordinating units and policies from the centre, and delivering coherent and integral policies and services that meet the growing pluralistic and dynamic needs of increasingly assertive clients and citizens and of the society as a whole. Consequently, new ways of problem solving, policymaking, and service delivery have emerged; these are referred to as *governance*.

### ***What is governance?***

In the literature, we identify four dominating meanings of the term *governance*:

- Governance as *good governance* or as *corporate governance*  
In this view, governance refers to the principles of a properly functioning public administration. Such an administration is characterized by the fair treatment of citizens and an unambiguous organization that adheres to the basic principles of the rule of law. The emphasis here is on the operation of government, rather than the manner in which it is organized.
- Governance as *New Public Management*, as improving performance and accountability, or as *market governance* (Hood 1991; Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Kettl 2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Fenger and Bekkers 2007)

Under this definition, the role of governments is to steer rather than to row (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Government should set goals and formulate policies. The implementation of policies and the delivery of services are best left to other organizations or separate public agencies that can be held accountable through the use of clear performance indicators and other market mechanisms, like contracts, competition, and benchmarks.

- Governance as *multi-level governance* or *inter-governmental relations*

In some studies, governance is described as multi-level government or inter-governmental governance. Although these two strands of literature are different from each other and not all the literature in these fields explicitly uses the network concept, their common theme is the difficulty of achieving results in a multi-actor setting. This literature stresses that networks are needed to address these problems, because they tend to cross the boundaries of public organizations and their hierarchical levels. The issues involved often relate to the economic regeneration of deprived areas or to environmental and pollution problems (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Bache and Flinders 2004; Marks and Hooge 2004). This literature focuses on specific types of networks in which public actors from various governmental levels have prominent positions.

- Governance as *network governance* (self-steering or non-self-steering)

Some authors writing on governance consider the concepts of governance and the network to be tightly connected. Governance takes place within networks of public and non-public actors, and the interaction between these groups makes processes complex and difficult to manage. Consequently, different steering and management strategies are required compared with more classical approaches. The focus here is on the complex interaction process in a network of public, private, and societal actors, including individuals, groups, organizations, and groups of organizations (Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1996; Kickert et al. 1997; Sørensen and Torfing 2007).

Although these conceptualizations of governance are different, they share some elements. All of them emphasize the *process* of governing rather than the *structure* of government. They also acknowledge the limits of governmental power. This supports the notion that governments in dealing with complexities shift from a government approach – implying that they use their formal hierarchical position to unilaterally impose solutions – to governance, in which their focus is on the process through which outcomes are achieved. As Pierre and Peters (2000: 194) state, ‘The strength of the state has become contextual and entrepreneurial rather than, as was previously the case, something derived from the constitutional and legal strength of the state institutions.’ This, however, is not enough to get a clear understanding of the concept of governance. Besides the commonalities between the various definitions of governance, differences also exist that often are not acknowledged, but that matter. The lack of clarity about what governance is exactly is in our opinion caused by four misunderstandings that confuse the debate on governance.

#### ***Four misunderstandings about governance***

If we look at the discussion on governance over the past 10–15 years, we can identify some misunderstandings that can account for the confusion about the concept.

*Governance is everywhere*

This is probably the most noteworthy misunderstanding due to the prevalence of the concept and its exaggerative use (Frederickson 2005). One can identify many tasks and services that are still performed in a bureaucratic setting and in a fairly hierarchical way, making them adhere well to classical theories of public administration. Tax collection, social security and social welfare services, health services, law and criminal justice, military service, and other public services are all often organized in classical bureaucracies with all the typical characteristics of those bureaucracies. Because we recognize alteration more than stability, we tend to overvalue the new form of organization known as governance. In that sense, the first meaning of governance – good governance or corporate governance – has not much to do with governance at all. These methods are simply classical principles of good public organization that are important for the functioning of the public service.

*Governance is New Public Management*

There is a significant, but often unidentified, difference between New Public Management and governance. New Public Management theories explicitly aim to resolve the ineffectiveness and uncontrollability of traditional bureaucratic governmental organizations. Steering at a distance, using performance indicators and market mechanisms, and separating policy and implementation are all practices designed to improve a bureaucracy's functioning by reducing its size and by subjecting it to clear market incentives. New Public Management can be considered an opposing paradigm to governance since it emphasizes the need for central steering. In much New Public Management literature, one can find the assumption that politics should set clear goals, steer with clear and cleverly designed incentives, and then leave implementation to other organizations (Hood 1991; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Governance, in contrast, tends to emphasize the horizontal relationships between governmental organizations and other organizations (for a comparison between Traditional Public Administration, New Public Management, and governance, see Box 1.3).

*Governance is a-political or technocratic*

In some governance literature (particularly from the US), we find a strong emphasis on performance with an implicit technical or even a-political disposition (see Frederickson 2005). Governance, then, is the way government gets its job done. Although this is certainly important, it must not divert our attention from the inherently political nature of governance processes. These processes are about reconciling different values as well as the different actors representing those values. Governance processes also involve struggles about the values represented in policymaking and policy outcomes. So, the debate on climate change is not simply about whether or not it is happening and what can be done

## 8 Introduction

about it; ultimately, it is also about the preservation of, or an attack on, a way of life and the distribution of wealth and other positive and negative impacts that result from it, not only locally but also on a global level. This is precisely what makes this type of issue so complex and difficult to solve with classical managerial instruments and skills (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Klijn and Skelcher 2007).

### *Governance is composed of self-governing networks*

Although not necessarily a mistaken idea, the understanding that networks are self-governing is certainly a bit confusing (Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1996; Sørensen and Torfing 2007). To many authors, this statement indicates that networks govern themselves without intervention from public actors, or, even more often, without the interference of political actors or without any deliberate governance. We can readily find networks that function with minimal interference from political actors: for instance, professionally oriented networks, such as medical services, where chains of organizations exist to serve clients in a coordinated way. However, even in these networks, explicit managerial functions operate to provide consistent guidance to the network, including professional codes for processing clients, agreements, and protocols regarding relations between organizations. We frequently find attempts by governmental actors to influence these so-called self-steering networks. Also, governance mechanisms like network rules, legislation, or market mechanisms may be in place (see Williamson 1979; Klijn 2008; Teisman et al. 2009). Often, self-governing processes get blocked or stagnate, because of conflicting interests, perceptions, strategies, or institutional barriers. In such instances, governance is needed to break through these impasses and arrive at cooperation and problem solving.

### ***Conclusion: we define governance as network governance***

We conclude from the above discussion that governance should be understood as governance within governance networks, or in other words: network governance. We base this conclusion on the observation that the literature shows that the theoretical foundations of governance and governance networks are basically the same. In contrast, the literature that does not have a connection to the literature on networks, such as that on good governance or corporate governance, is based on theories and concepts that are closely related to traditional government literature and addresses the question how to improve the functioning of traditional governmental organizations. The literature on improving performance by market governance and performance indicators includes arguments that are strongly inspired by the ideas of New Public Management. These latter approaches to governance do not contribute much to the study of governance in networks, which focuses on relationships with other actors and the process of handling complex problems, and processes of policy implementation and service delivery. In many ways, they are in opposition to the central ideas and theories of governance.

### Box 1.3 Comparing Traditional Public Administration, New Public Management, and the governance network perspective

Whereas the governance network perspective tends to emphasize the horizontal relationships between governmental and other organizations, New Public Management (NPM) can be considered an opposing paradigm to governance in many ways. NPM emphasizes central steering and political control, showing in that respect similarities with the hierarchical orientation of the Traditional Public Administration Model, whereas governance tends to emphasize the limits of central control. The title of the classical Hanf and Scharpf (1978) book on networks is after all: *Interorganizational Policy Making: Limits to coordination and central control*. And NPM and network governance imply very different responses to the fact that society has become very complex. Table 1.1 summarizes some of the main differences between the Traditional Public Administration Model, New Public Management, and the governance network perspective.

Table 1.1 Three dominant perspectives in public administration

	<i>Traditional Public Administration</i>	<i>New Public Management</i>	<i>Governance Network perspective</i>
<b>Focus</b>	Differentiation and coordination within bureaucracy	Internal functioning of governmental bodies and contractual relations	Relations between governments and with other actors (inter-organizational focus)
<b>Objectives</b>	Production of effective and uniform policies and services according to principles of equality, legitimacy, and legality	Improving effectiveness and efficiency of public service delivery and public organizations	Improving inter-organizational coordination and quality of policymaking and service delivery
<b>Core ideas/management techniques</b>	Using hierarchy and command and control; line management; building on rule following, loyalty and a public service orientation of civil servants; policy cycle as control mechanism	Using business and market instruments (modern management techniques, market mechanisms, performance indicators, consumer boards) to improve service delivery	Using network management: activating actors, organizing research and information gathering (joint fact-finding), exploring content, arranging, process rules, and so forth

(Continued)



Table 1.1 (Continued)

	<i>Traditional Public Administration</i>	<i>New Public Management</i>	<i>Governance Network perspective</i>
<b>Politics</b>	Politicians set goals that are implemented by the executive in a neutral way. Both civil servants and elected administrators are held accountable by representative bodies of elected politicians	Politicians set goals. Policy implementation and service delivery is done by independent agencies or market mechanisms on the basis of clear performance indicators	Goals are developed and negotiated during interaction processes, with no sharp distinction between formation, implementation, and delivery of policies and services. Politicians are part of these processes or facilitate these processes
<b>Complexity in society</b>	Complexity is dealt with by deconstruction and assigning task to specialized units; dealt with as intellectual design process with input of policy analysts, professionals, and scientific knowledge	Complexity requires the setting of clear goals and allowing implementers discretionary space to realize outcomes. Keep away from the complex interactions with society. Use market incentives to govern implementing units	Complexity requires interaction and network relations given interdependencies. Taking part in complexity by interacting with actors in society is unavoidable and/ or necessary to reach effective and supported outcomes

### 1.3 Defining governance networks and network governance

Governance is the process that takes place within governance networks. Although governance networks are conceptualized in a variety of ways, most definitions have certain common characteristics:

- Networks are characterized by complex policy problems that cannot be solved by one actor alone, but require the collective actions of several actors (Mandell 2001; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).
- Networks have relatively high interdependencies between actors because resources necessary to solve problems are owned by different actors (Hanf and Scharpf 1978).
- These interdependencies cause a high degree of strategic complexity and an unpredictable course of (inter)actions (Hanf and Scharpf 1978; Gage and Mandell 1990; Sørensen and Torfing 2007) as actions of one actor affect the interests and strategies of other actors.

- Networks have complex interactions because each of the actors is autonomous and has its own perception of problems, solutions, and strategies (Hanf and Scharpf 1978; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; McGuire and Agranoff 2011). This leads to substantial differences in perceptions, value conflicts, and disagreement about policies to be implemented and services to be delivered.
- Network interactions show some durability over time (Laumann and Knoke 1987; Agranoff and McGuire 2003).

We elaborate these characteristics of governance networks in Part I of the book.

In this book, we use the term *governance network* to describe public policymaking, implementation, and service delivery through a web of relationships between autonomous yet interdependent government, business, and civil society actors. We define governance networks as *more or less stable patterns of social relations between mutually dependent actors, which cluster around a policy problem, a policy programme, and/or a set of resources and which emerge, are sustained, and are changed through a series of interactions* (compare Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).

In addition to the term governance network, in this book we use the following core concepts: governance network processes, network governance, and network management. We define these concepts as follows:

- *Governance network processes are all the interaction processes within governance networks addressing a specific problem, policy, programme, or public service.*
- *Network governance we define as the set of conscious steering attempts or strategies of actors within governance networks aimed at influencing interaction processes and/or the characteristics of these networks.*

By applying these strategies, actors within networks produce outcomes in terms of solutions, policies, and services. They do so without conscious attempts at steering from a non-partial or meta perspective. In this sense, these processes are self-governing (compare Kooiman 1993).

- *Network management we define as all the deliberate strategies aimed at facilitating and guiding the interactions and/or changing the features of the network with the intent to further the collaboration within the network processes.*

In the literature, other terms are used for network management like meta-governance (Jessop 2002; Sørensen and Torfing 2007), collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash 2008), or collaborative management (O'Leary and Bingham 2009), which more or less refer to the same type of activities. In this book, we confine ourselves to the use of the term network management, which is the most common in the network literature (certainly in the US).

## 1.4 Complexity in governance networks

Complexity is an inherent characteristic of governance networks that are confronted with societal problems and that try to develop policies and services to deal with these.

In defining complexity, we contrast this concept with complicatedness. *Complicatedness* applies to a technical or social phenomenon or system that consists of many components that interact in a complicated way with one another. Complicatedness can be unravelled by decomposition and information gathering, making an inventory, and analyzing the components of the system. The interactions may be complicated but can be known by calculating possible scenarios regarding future states of the phenomenon or system. The availability of modern computers with huge calculation power makes it possible to tame almost any form of complicatedness (Walker 2000; Koliba et al. 2010). *Complexity* goes beyond complicatedness because it refers to *dynamics* within systems. Not only do components interact in unpredictable and ever-changing ways, but also the characteristics of the components themselves are hard to know and subject to change. Within social systems, complexity is also a result of the *reflective* nature of the agents that are part of it: actors that behave unpredictably, that can make conscious decisions, and that may even consciously counteract expectations. As a result, it is impossible to fully predict complexity, to tame it by information gathering, extrapolation, and calculations (Kickert 1993; Elliott and Kiel 1999; Gerrits 2012; Morçöl 2012). We distinguish three major types of complexity that characterize governance networks: substantive, strategic, and institutional complexity. In this section, we briefly address these.

### ***Substantive complexity***

*Substantive complexity* within governance networks is not so much caused by the complicatedness of problems and lack of information and knowledge. Rather, it is caused by the uncertainty and lack of consensus over the nature of problems, their causes and solutions. Problem solving, policymaking, and service delivery within the public sector involve a wide set of actors. These actors have different perceptions of the situation and also interpret available information differently. Thus, collecting information and tapping into knowledge cannot solve the substantive complexity of wicked problems as long as the meaning of information is interpreted in a different way (Sabatier 1988, 2007; Rein and Schön 1992). Research activities and the mobilization of expertise, therefore, do not necessarily lead to less substantive complexity – in fact, they may contribute to it (Lindblom and Cohen 1979; Hoppe 1999, 2011; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).

### ***Strategic complexity***

Strategic complexity in governance networks springs from the strategic choices actors make with regard to problems, policies, and services (Allison 1971; Crozier and Friedberg 1980; Ostrom 1990, 2007; Axelrod 2006 [1984]; Kingdon 2011 [1984]). In a complex society characterized by horizontalization and network formation, actors have discretion to make their own choices. Because actors ground their strategies in unique perceptions, which other actors often do not

acknowledge or are unaware of, a large variety of strategies may emerge. Furthermore, actors respond to, and anticipate, one another's strategic moves. Because of these mechanisms, it is difficult to predict what strategies actors will choose and how unexpected strategic turns and the interaction of the various strategies will influence the interaction process. Thus, strategic complexity concerns the fundamentally erratic and unpredictable nature of interaction processes within governance networks (see also Teisman et al. 2009; Gerrits 2012). This strategic complexity is not easy to reduce and can never be eliminated completely.

### ***Institutional complexity***

Finally, governance networks are characterized by *institutional complexity*. Not only does dealing with complex problems, policies, and services require the involvement of various actors, but these actors often work from different institutional backgrounds (Burns and Flam 1987; March and Olsen 1989). Complex problems, policies, and services often cut across the existing demarcations between organizations, administrative levels, and networks. As a consequence, interactions between actors are difficult since their behaviour is guided by outlooks, organizational arrangements, procedures, and rules of different organizations, administrative levels, and networks. Thus, interaction in governance networks is characterized by clashes between divergent institutional regimes and displays institutional complexity. Consequently, for all actors, there is a high degree of uncertainty about how the process will be handled and what rules will guide the interaction with other actors. Institutional complexity, like the other forms of complexity, cannot simply be 'solved.' It is often not possible to directly influence the existing institutional characteristics of networks since they are anchored in formal legal frames and in deeply rooted informal convictions and practices. Insofar as institutional interventions are realized, their effectiveness is highly uncertain (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).

### ***Managing complexities in governance networks***

In current complex societies, wicked problems, and the innovative and integral policies and services that they require, cannot be handled in a traditional way. Traditional policy analysis, which approaches complex problems as an intellectual design activity, will not do, given the strategic and institutional challenges involved. Nor will traditional hierarchical forms of government, or the market-oriented alternatives provided by New Public Management, be suitable. Mutual dependencies make it impossible for each of the involved actors to act in isolation, or as principals and agents. Governance network processes require actors to coordinate their perceptions, activities, and institutional arrangements. In searching for ways to map and manage substantive, strategic, and institutional complexities, in this book we apply the concepts and ideas provided by governance network theory. The mutual dependence of actors is a central notion in the network approach (Hanf and Scharpf 1978; Rhodes 1997; Milward and

Wamsley 1985; O'Toole 1997; Kickert et al. 1997; Klijn and Koppenjan 2000a; Mandell 2001; McGuire and Agranoff 2011).

The network approach provides theoretical concepts and normative starting points for analyzing and assessing complex processes of problem solving, public policymaking, and service delivery in network settings and the roles that perceptions, strategic interactions, and institutions play in this. The governance network perspective distinguishes itself from other, more rational approaches to problem solving, policymaking, and service delivery by using the multi-actor nature of interaction settings and the presence of diverging and sometimes conflicting perceptions, objectives, and institutions as the starting point for analysis and management. It investigates the consequences of this insight for the way governance network processes evolve and for how these processes can be designed and managed. Thus, the governance network approach links theory building and analysis closely to a management perspective. The objective of this book is not only to provide concepts for the analysis and understanding of complexities in governance networks, but also to develop recommendations for practitioners about how these complexities can be governed. It provides prescriptions for strategies to be used by actors within networks, as well as for network management strategies aimed at improving the interactions between parties and the functioning of networks as a whole.

#### **1.4 Contributions to governance network theory**

With this book, we also aim to contribute to the further development of network theory. Within the literature, a number of observations have been made regarding particularities and potential weaknesses of network theory. These observations include the following:

- The divide between approaches aimed at the institutional dimensions of networks (e.g. Laumann and Knoke 1987; Provan and Kenis 2008, and more specifically the social network analysis approach) and those addressing the interaction and governance processes of networks (O'Toole 1988; Gage and Mandell 1990; Kickert et al. 1997). Blom-Hansen (1997), for instance, made a plea for combining an institutional approach with an action perspective.
- The lack of attention to the content of issues and debates and the role of framing in the argumentation games that are played in the policymaking process, as identified in what is called interpretive, argumentative, or deliberative policy analysis (Fischer and Forester 1993; Fischer 2003b; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003).
- The variety in the focus of network approaches. Some address complex decision making or planning, whereas others address the process of policy implementation or public service delivery (Provan and Milward 1995; Meier and O'Toole 2001; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004) without specifying this and without reflecting upon the implications of these differences (Koppenjan 2012; Keast et al. 2014).

- The one-sided focus on the effectiveness of governance network processes, without paying attention to other (public) values involved and more specifically to the democratic nature of networks and accountability issues involved (Sørensen and Torfing 2003, 2007; Klijn and Skelcher 2007; van Meerkerk 2014).

In this book, we aim to address these particularities in the following way. First of all, we have the ambition to bridge the division between the institutional and interactionist traditions of the network approach. We do so by distinguishing between strategic and institutional complexity; this enables us to look at both factors in our analysis and prescriptions and specify the way they relate to each other.

By making substantive complexity, in addition to strategic and institutional complexity, a central concept in our analysis, we also address the criticism that the network approach neglects the substantive aspects of issues and policy debates.

Third, this book aims to address issues of problem solving, policymaking and implementation, and the design and delivery of public services, thus connecting the various strands of literature addressing these respective topics. We argue that processes of design and implementation of policies and public services in governance networks involve addressing wicked problems, for which the analytical, managerial, and normative approach we develop offers a generic framework.

Fourth, this book does not see governance networks exclusively as instruments to arrive at effective solutions for wicked problems. A point of departure for the network approach that we envision is that governments have to address and safeguard various competing public values at the same time, including concerns on democratic legitimacy and accountability (Beck Jørgenson and Bozeman 2002; Koppenjan et al. 2008; Veeneman et al. 2009; Koppenjan 2012). This concern guides our analysis and recommendations throughout the book, but it is explicitly dealt with in Part III on the normative issues involved in governance networks.

## 1.5 Objective and structure of this book

This book is inspired by the observation that many contemporary societal problems are wicked. We have seen in this chapter that wickedness is closely related to changes in society over the past decades. This development can be summarized as the emergence of a network society that influences the nature of issues in society and the ways of dealing with them. In this network society, hierarchical relations lose relevance because authority, knowledge, and means are distributed across a large number of actors. Activities in the network society go beyond the institutional boundaries of organizations, public and private sectors, and administrative units. Complex issues and the contexts in which they are articulated and managed transcend boundaries, giving issues their wicked nature: they are characterized by substantive, strategic, and institutional complexity. An effective approach to wicked problems requires societal parties to learn to deal with these types of complexity in a satisfactory manner. The standard responses

that actors generally tend to use in dealing with complexity are not only sub-optimal, but also often counterproductive. Instead of reducing complexity, they often strengthen it.

In this book, we explore more satisfactory responses to the complexities that characterize wicked problems in network settings.

The central question of this book therefore is: *how can the substantive, strategic, and institutional complexities that characterize governance networks be analyzed and managed in an effective, democratically legitimate, and accountable way, given the features of these complexities, and the sources from which they stem?*

### **Structure of this book**

To answer this question, this book is organized as follows. In Parts I, II, and III, respectively, governance networks, network management, and normative questions involved in dealing with governance networks are central. We use the triads of substantive, strategic, and institutional complexity and of content, process, and institutions, to organize our analysis of governance networks in Part I and our discussion of network management in Part II. Part III deals with normative issues in governance networks. Part IV provides a synthesis by presenting an encompassing analytical guideline and a reflection upon the nature, limitations, and potentials of governance networks. Below, we discuss the contents of parts and chapters in more detail.

#### *Part I: Governance networks*

In the first part of this book, we introduce the theoretical principles and the conceptual building blocks of governance network theory that help us to understand the nature and functioning of governance networks.

*Chapter 2* presents an overview of the literature on networks as published in the last decades of the last century, and the sources of inspiration upon which it draws. This chapter sketches the theoretical and practical context of the ideas on governance networks as developed in this book, and it provides building blocks for the framework that we draw up.

*Chapter 3* deals with the manifestations and sources of substantive complexity that are connected to the content of interaction processes in governance networks. Among other things, we discuss the nature of wicked problems that underlie policymaking and service delivery, the presence of perceptions and framing, and the role of research, experts, and (scientific) knowledge in the production of substantive complexity.

In *Chapter 4*, we address the nature and sources of strategic complexity in governance network processes. We demonstrate that the involvement of multiple actors, interests, and strategies results in complex and unpredictable strategic games, and how this complexity is strengthened by the fragmented nature of the policy game and the dynamics of developments in the environment.

*Chapter 5* deals with the institutional complexity of governance networks. We discuss networks as institutions with their own patterns of interactions, perceptions, and rules. Special attention is given to the nature and institutionalization of rules and to the role of trust.

### *Part II: Network management*

In Part II, we present the theoretical insights and conceptual building blocks that governance network theory provides regarding network management and the subsequent repertoire of network management strategies.

In *Chapter 6*, we discuss the opportunities for managing substantive complexity in governance network processes through the creation of substantive variety and facilitating mutual cognitive learning behaviour. We also address how research and (scientific) knowledge can be embedded in these processes.

*Chapter 7* presents opportunities for managing strategic complexity through the initiation, design, and facilitation of interaction processes within governance networks.

In *Chapter 8*, we address opportunities for managing institutional complexity by the institutional design and governance of the processes by which these designs are developed and implemented. We also discuss the empirical and normative limitations involved.

### *Part III: Normative issues in governance networks*

In Part III, we deal with the normative issues in networks: their democratic legitimacy, their accountability, their assessment in terms of success and failure and the values that underlie that assessment.

*Chapter 9* discusses the relationship between networks and democracy. Networks are often seen as horizontal arrangements that are hard to control by the vertically organized institutions of representative democracy, or as forms of direct democracy that compete or even replace traditional forms of democracy. In this chapter, various traditions of democracy are presented and used to examine in what respect and to what extent networks and network processes can gain democratic legitimacy.

*Chapter 10* focuses on accountability processes in networks. The opaque and closed nature of governance networks has led to the conclusion that they are problematic from an accountability perspective. This chapter investigates in what respect this is the case and how governance can improve the accountability of governance networks.

*Chapter 11* discusses how the success and failure of governance networks and network processes can be assessed. We argue there that evaluation of governance networks is quite different from how evaluation traditionally is envisaged and that we need other methods and criteria to evaluate processes and outcomes of networks. This also implies that, in network assessment, various competing public values are involved, including democratic legitimacy and accountability.



*Part IV: Synthesis and reflection*

The book ends with two concluding chapters.

*Chapter 12* presents a synthesis of the previous chapters by presenting a comprehensive stepwise analytical schedule for analyzing and assessing governance networks and network governance.

We conclude the book with *Chapter 13*, in which we present a synthesis of the central ideas put forward in this book. The central arguments and concepts are summarized and combined into an overall theoretical framework. Finally we present a short reflection on the implications of the predominance of the network-like context of public problem solving, policymaking and service delivery in the public sector, and the extent to which the ideas proposed in this book align with developments towards a New Public Governance as envisioned by various contemporary authors.

# NETWERKMANAGEMENT IN DE PUBLIEKE SECTOR ('NETMAN' - F10358)

Joris Voets – sessie 01/10/2019 – 10u-13u

## INHOUD

1. Situering
2. Conceptualisering
3. Wetenschappelijk gekaderd
4. Netwerken in drie soorten complexiteit ontrafeld



# 1. SAMENWERKEN IN NETWERKEN GESITUEERD

## A. SITUERING

VAN TOENEMENDE...


- ...complexiteit van problemen ('wicked issues')
- ...complexiteit van het landschap door o.m. fragmentatie, specialisatie en professionalisering
- ...budgettaire druk
- ...eisen op vlak van dienstverlening en kwaliteit
- ...



## A. SITUERING

### – ...NAAR MEER SAMENWERKING

scheme 1 Depiction of Societal Development to Account for the Increased Call for Partnerships and Alternative Responses to the New Situation



**Voor welke maatschappelijke problemen/beleid/dienstverlening is volgens jou samenwerking vereist?**



## CONCREET: WAAROM WERKEN WE SAMEN?

Markontwikkeling en – positie	Kostenvoordelen	Kennisontwikkeling	Externe druk
Ontwikkelen van gezamenlijke marketingkracht	Realiseren van schaalvoordelen	Organiseren van gezamenlijke innovatie	Politieke druk: één gezicht voor de burger
Verbeteren en vergroten van de distributiekraft	Overwinnen van investeringsbelemmeringen	Verkrijgen van toegang tot nieuwe technologie	Wettelijke verplichting tot samenwerking of consultatie
Ontwikkelen van nieuwe markten en producten	Realiseren van gezamenlijke ondersteunende diensten	Gebruikmaken van aanvullende competenties van partners	Moreel appel van samenleving of politiek
Verkrijgen van toegang tot nieuwe markten	Verdere efficiency en rationalisatie van de productie	Leren van de vaardigheden en kennis van partners	
Bescherming tegen concurrentie	Rationalisatie door betere afstemming in de keten	Leren van de cultuur van partners	
Binding van afnemers en leveranciers door ketenintegratie en -coördinatie		Nieuwe octrooien verwerven en toegang tot octrooien verkrijgen	

Kaats &amp; Opheij 2013:30

7

## PRAKTIJK AAN HET WOORD: WAT ZIJN UW DOELSTELLINGEN IN UW NETWERK?

- Betere & efficiëntere dienstverlening
- Efficiëntie & effectiviteit verbeteren (processen, betere informatie-uitwisseling; ook naar burgers toe)
- Met verzamelde gegevens beleid voeren
- Leren (informatie, kennis aanboren, benchlearning)
- Administratieve vereenvoudiging via gegevensdeling
- Vertrouwen creëren
- Een voet in huis bij sommige organisaties (invloed)
- Realisatie eigen doelstellingen via netwerk
- Gedeelde visie & synergie ontwikkelen
- Promotie/reclame eigen diensten en organisatie
- Draagvlak vergroten bij toekomstige gebruikers

## POTENTIËLE VOORDELEN



- $1+1=2,5$
- Inbreng van hulpbronnen van andere actoren (geld, informatie, legitimiteit, personeel, bevoegdheden)
- Groter draagvlak
- Groter bereik
- Meer/betere dienstverlening voor evenveel/minder geld
- Meer/beter personeel
- Meer/betere instrumenten
- Meer/betere lobbying
- Extra motivatie personeel (netwerking & ‘fun-factor’)
- ...

## PRAKTIJK AAN HET WOORD:



“Don’t do it unless you have to...  
...but if you do it, go for it!” (Van Garsse 2012)

## WETENSCHAP AAN HET WOORD:

“Organisaties die overleven of zelfs floreren in deze ‘eeuw van de samenwerking’ zijn precies diegene die kiezen voor een strategie van samenwerking met anderen!”

(Vrij naar Agranoff 2007 en Daft 2013)











## SAMENWERKING IN STIJGENDE LIJN



## SAMENWERKING IN STIJGENDE LIJN



per gemeente

0 tot 50	(53)
50 tot 59	(93)
60 tot 69	(41)
70 tot 79	(47)
80 tot 99	(41)
100 en meer	(33)

## VB. WELZIJSBELEID: SAMENWERKING IKV:

- Bijzondere jeugdzorg
- Thuiszorg
- 1stelijsgezondheidszorg
- Geestelijke gezondheidszorg
- Intrafamiliaal geweld-ouderenmis(be)handeling
- Mensen met schulden
- Gedetineerden en geïnterneerden
- Thuislozen
- Zorginfrastructuur
- Onderzoek & internationale valorisatie
- Jongerenwelzijn
- Kinderopvang
- Interbestuurlijk (fed-reg-prov-lok)
- Intrabestuurlijk (WVG & WVG-andere)
- ...

*(beleidsnota Vandeurzen 2009-2014)*

## VB. WELZIJSBELEID: NETWERKEN IKV:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. Sociaal netwerk  | 10. Palliatieve netwerken                     |
| 2. Meetnetwerk  | 11. Zorgnetwerken                             |
| 3. Netwerk rond opvoedingswinkels                             | 12. Netwerkvorming ikv                        |
| 4. Vlaams Netwerk van Verenigingen waar armen het woord nemen | ouderenmis(be)handeling                       |
| 5. Gegevensinformatienetwerk                                  | 13. Netwerkvorming rond verkeersslachtoffers  |
| 6. Crisisnetwerk  | 14. Referentienetwerken                       |
| 7. Netwerken om kansengroepen te bereiken                     | 15. LOGO-netwerken                            |
| 8. Netwerkpleeggezin  | 16. Netwerk van aanspreekpunten kinderrechten |
| 9. Woonzorgnetwerk  | 17. Euregha                                   |

*(beleidsnota Vandeurzen 2009-2014)*

## VB. RUIMTELIJK BELEID



### “Voorwaarden:

Projecten moeten bijdragen aan de uitvoering van het Ruimtelijk Structuurplan Vlaanderen. Ze moeten een impact hebben op Vlaams niveau, vertrekken vanuit bestaande visies en de **samenwerking van ruimtelijke actoren in een gebied stimuleren**.

Het project moet onder meer aan volgende voorwaarden voldoen (zie toelichting in het aanvraagformulier):

1. Bovenlokaal niveau en gerelateerd aan een ruimtelijk planningsproces
2. Voorbeeld- en signaalfunctie
3. Integraal karakter (meerdere aspecten)
4. Stimuleert een vernieuwingsproces
5. Vergroot de functionele verwevenheid
6. Administratieve en institutionele complexiteit ”


<https://rsv.ruimtevlaanderen.be/RSV/Ruimtelijk-Structuurplan-Vlaanderen/Strategische-projecten/Oproep>

## SAMENWERKING ALS DAGELIJKSE KOST

- *“Mensensmokkelbende opgerold in Gent”* (DS, 28.09.19)
- *“Daadkracht voor het klimaat”* (Trends, 26.09.19)
- *“Vier Hagelandse gemeenten gaan nauwer samenwerken”* (DS, 26.09.19)
- *“Hoe redden we onze gezondheidszorg?”* (Knack, 18.09.19)

# SAMENWERKEN ⇔ ANDERE STRATEGIEËN

## NETMAN



## SAMENWERKEN IN NETWERKEN?

KENMERK	NIET INDIEN	WEL INDIEN
Probleem	Eenvoudig, vaag	Complex
Oplossingsstrategie	Eigen oplossingen	Openheid – leren
Steun van top	Afwezig	Aanwezig
Mandatering mensen	Afwezig	Aanwezig
Investeringsbereidheid	Afwezig	Aanwezig
Gelijkwaardigheid	Dominante opstelling	Open opstelling
Resultaten	Enkel KT	KT & LT



IS SAMENWERKEN IN NETWERKEN STEEDS DE BESTE/MINST SLECHTE OPLOSSING?

(Naar Agranoff 2012)

## POTENTIËLE NADELEN



- Algemeen belang bedreigd (koehandel, praatbarak, mind goede dienstverlening, ...)
- Verhinderend beleidsinnovatie
- Niet-transparante besluitvorming
- Onvoldoende democratische legitimiteit
- Uithollen eigen organisatie
- Nieuwe monopolies
- Hoge transactiekosten
- ...

## 2. SAMENWERKEN IN NETWERKEN GEDEFINIEERD

## A. DEFINITIES

SAMENWERKING =


- breed: “*alle gemeenschappelijke inspanningen van personen gericht op bepaald doel*”
- Focus NETMAN (1): in de eerste plaats gericht op organisaties, dwz samenwerking =
  - “*Een doelgerichte relatie tussen minstens 2 onafhankelijke actoren betreffende de uitwisseling, het delen of het samen ontwikkelen van hulpbronnen of capaciteit om wederzijds relevante voordelen te bereiken*” (vrij naar Gulati 1995)
- Focus NETMAN (2): samenwerking in functie van publiek doel
- Focus NETMAN (3):
  - NIET: bilateraal, 1 op 1, principaal-agent
  - WEL: SAMENWERKING IN NETWERK = 3 of meer actoren, met min. 1 publieke actor & met oog op publiek doel



25

## NETWERK =

- Horizontale relaties...
  - Met zekere stabiliteit/duurzaamheid
  - Met zekere graad van structurering
- Tussen min. 3 actoren...
  - Die relatief autonoom zijn
  - En die afhankelijk zijn van elkaar
- Waarin hulpbronnen\* worden uitgewisseld
  - Door onderhandelen
  - Om een publiek doel te bereiken



\* = financiële capaciteit, bevoegdheden, informatie, legitimiteit, productiecapaciteit

26

## NETWERK ⇔ ORGANISATIE?

- ≠ met klassieke organisatie?
- Onduidelijk machtscentrum
- Interdependentie
- Nieuwe werkelijkheid
- Heterogeniteit



Kaats &amp; Opheij 2013:34-37

27


## VERWANTE BEGRIPPEN

- Verwante labels: Samenwerkingsverbanden, publiek-publieke samenwerking, publiek-private samenwerking, allianties, partnerschappen, shared service centres, ketens, ...
- Verwante thema's: vertrouwen, leiderschap, prestaties, management, planning, ...



28

## VERWANTE BEGRIPPEN: KETENS < NETWERKEN



= een netwerk van weliswaar autonome organisaties die in onderlinge samenhang de voortbrenging van een product/dienst tot stand brengen

= Zijn een specifieke vorm van interorganisationele samenwerking

= Verbinden de handelingen van organisaties die samen iets kunnen betekenen voor een cliënt.

= Willen verantwoordelijkheden die over autonome organisaties versnipperd zijn, verbinden tot een sluitend en werkend geheel

= samenhangend geheel van geschakelde input- en outputprocessen, gericht op de voortbrenging van een product of dienst

Schakel:

= processtap in de keten die waarde toevoegt aan de keten in het geheel en voor de cliënt in het bijzonder




(Van der Aa en Konijn, 2001; De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2004)

29

## KETENS: VB. STRAFRECHTKETEN (NL)

Figuur 1. Ketensamenwerking in de strafrechtketen in beeld gebracht

In onderstaande figuur is als voorbeeld de strafrechtketen weergegeven.



<https://www.pwc.nl/nl/assets/documents/pwc-maatschappelijke-ketens.pdf>

30



## VERWANTE BEGRIPPEN

### – **Collaborative governance:**

*“Een bestuursarrangement waarin één of meerdere publieke actoren niet-publieke stakeholders direct engageren in een gezamenlijk besluitvormingsproces dat (a) formeel is, (b) consensusgericht is en (c) deliberatief is en (d) gericht is op het maken of uitvoeren van publiek beleid of het managen van publieke programma's of 'assets'” (vrije vertaling uit Ansell & Gash 2008:544)*

### – **Collaborative management:**

*“betreft de processen van het faciliteren en opereren in multi-organisationale arrangementen om problemen op te lossen die niet of moeilijk door één organisatie opgelost kunnen worden” (vrije vertaling uit Agranoff 2012:2)*

## B. HET ENE NETWERK IS HET ANDERE NIET

### **Dimensie 1 - partners:**

- Aantal: enkele – veel
- Aard:
  - [Privaat-privaat]
  - Publiek-privaat
    - publiek-non-profit
    - Publiek-social-profit
    - Publiek-profit
  - Publiek-publiek (interbestuurlijk)
    - Horizontaal (tss zelfde bestuurslaag, bv. IGS)
    - Verticaal (over bestuurslagen heen, bv. Vla-gem)



## B. HET ENE NETWERK IS HET ANDERE NIET




VB. regioscreening

AGENTSCHAP  
BINNENLANDS  
BESTUUR

 **Vlaanderen**  
is lokaal bestuur

- <http://lokaalbestuur.vlaanderen.be/verzelfstandiging-en-samenwerking/regiovorming/interactieve-beleidsrapporten-lokale-samenwerking>

## C. WETENSCHAPPELIJKE TYPOLOGIËN



**Table 1**  
Key Predictors of Effectiveness of Network Governance Forms

Governance Forms	Trust	Number of Participants	Goal Consensus	Need for Network-Level Competencies
Shared governance	High density	Few	High	Low
Lead organization	Low density, highly centralized	Moderate number	Moderately low	Moderate
Network administrative organization	Moderate density, NAO monitored by members	Moderate to many	Moderately high	High

Bron: Keith Provan & Patrick Kenis (2007) 'Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness'. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*.

## C. WETENSCHAPPELIJKE TYPOLOGIËN

Network Continuum		
COOPERATIVE	COORDINATIVE	COLLABORATIVE
Low trust — unstable relations	Medium trust — based on prior relations	High trust — stable relations
Infrequent communication	Structured communication flows	Thick communication flows
Known information sharing	Project-related and directed information sharing	Tacit information sharing
Adjusting actions	Joint projects, funding and policy	Systems change; breakthrough innovations
Independent/autonomous goals	Semi-independent goals	Dense, reciprocally interdependent relations/goals
Power remains with organization	Power remains with organizations, shared around project	Shared power
Resources — remain own	Shared resources around project	Pooled, collective resources
Commitment and accountability to own agency	Commitment and accountability to own agency and project	Commitment and accountability to the network first
Relational time frame — short term	Relational time frame medium term — often based on prior project work	Relational time frame — long-term 3–5 years

## 3. SAMENWERKING IN NETWERKEN MANAGEN = NETWERKMANAGEMENT WETENSCHAPPELIJK GESITUEERD

# TACKLING CHALLENGES IN THE NETWORK SOCIETY (?)



*"It's the management, stupid!"* (Klijn, 2008)

39

## NETWERKEN ALS PERSPECTIEF GESITUEERD

Table 1.1 Three dominant perspectives in public administration

	Traditional Public Administration	New Public Management	Governance Network perspective
<b>Focus</b>	Differentiation and coordination within bureaucracy	Internal functioning of governmental bodies and contractual relations	Relations between governments and with other actors (inter-organizational focus)
<b>Objectives</b>	Production of effective and uniform policies and services according to principles of equality, legitimacy, and legality	Improving effectiveness and efficiency of public service delivery and public organizations	Improving inter-organizational coordination and quality of policymaking and service delivery
<b>Core ideas/management techniques</b>	Using hierarchy and command and control; line management; building on rule following, loyalty and a public service orientation of civil servants; policy cycle as control mechanism	Using business and market instruments (modern management techniques, market mechanisms, performance indicators, consumer boards) to improve service delivery	Using network management: activating actors, organizing research and information gathering (joint fact-finding), exploring content, arranging, process rules, and so forth

(Continued)

Table 1.1 (Continued)

	Traditional Public Administration	New Public Management	Governance Network perspective
<b>Politics</b>	Politicians set goals that are implemented by the executive in a neutral way. Both civil servants and elected administrators are held accountable by representative bodies of elected politicians	Politicians set goals. Policy implementation and service delivery is done by independent agencies or market mechanisms on the basis of clear performance indicators	Goals are developed and negotiated during interaction processes, with no sharp distinction between formation, implementation, and delivery of policies and services. Politicians are part of these processes or facilitate these processes
<b>Complexity in society</b>	Complexity is dealt with by deconstruction and assigning task to specialized units; dealt with as intellectual design process with input of policy analysts, professionals, and scientific knowledge	Complexity requires the setting of clear goals and allowing implementers discretionary space to realize outcomes. Keep away from the complex interactions with society. Use market incentives to govern implementing units	Complexity requires interaction and network relations given interdependencies. Taking part in complexity by interacting with actors in society is unavoidable and/or necessary to reach effective and supported outcomes

(Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016)

40

## DEFINITIES KLIJN & KOPPENJAN (2016)

- Governance network (p. 10):  
*“more or less stable patterns of social relations between mutually dependent actors, which cluster around a policy problem, a policy programme, and/or a set of resources and which emerge, are sustained, and are changed through a series of interactions”*

## DEFINITIES KLIJN & KOPPENJAN (2016)

- Governance network processes (p. 10):  
 = *“all the interaction processes within governance networks addressing a specific problem, policy, programme, or public service”*
- Network governance (p. 10):  
 = *“a set of conscious steering attempts or strategies of actors within governance networks aimed at influencing interaction processes and/or the characteristics of these networks”*

## DEFINITIES KLIJN & KOPPENJAN (2016)

- Network management (p. 10):  
 = *“all the deliberate strategies aimed at facilitating and guiding the interactions and/or changing the features of the network with the intent to further the collaboration within the network processes”*

Table 2.1 Types of networks in empirical research and their characteristics

	Policy networks	Service delivery and implementation	Collaborative and network governance
<b>Main origin</b>	Political science	Organizational science/inter-organization theory	Public administration, collaborative planning, and argumentative policy analysis
<b>Focus</b>	Decision making and effects Closure and power relations on issue and agenda setting	Inter-organizational coordination Effective policy/service delivery Integrated policy/services	Solving societal problems by managing horizontal collaboration
<b>Main fields and research questions</b>	Which actors are involved in decision making? How are the power relations and what are the effects on decision making?	How can complex integrated services be coordinated? What mechanisms are effective and efficient (contracting, partnerships, etc.)?	How to manage governance networks How to organize them and connect them to traditional institutions How to improve variety of content and combine various value judgements
<b>History</b>	Starts with the pluralist political science research of the 1960s and continues through to research on subsystems, policy communities, and policy networks	Starts with the first inter-organizational theorists that focus on inter-organizational coordination and continues through to research on service delivery (also through contracting) and implementation	Starts in the mid-1970s with work on inter-governmental relations (Hanf and Scharpf 1978) and continues with analyses of new governance forms and their effects and management requirements

## NETWERKEN? THEORETISCHE WORTELS

<b>Authors (1960–2000)</b>	In the 1960s: pluralist (Dahl 1961; Truman 1964) and elitist (Hunter 1953), subsystems (Freeman 1965) Agenda forming (Cobb and Elder 1983 [1972]; Baumgartner and Jones 2009 [1993]); policy communities (Jordan 1990; Rhodes 1988, 1997)	Levine and White (1961); Litwak and Hylton (1962); Negandhi (1975); Aldrich (1979); Benson (1982); Pfeffer (1981); Milward and Provan (2000)	Scharpf ( <i>politik verflechtung</i> ) (1978); Hanf and Scharpf (1978); Hjerm and Porter (implementation networks) (1981); O'Toole (1988); Gage and Mandell (1990); Marin and Mayntz (1991); Kickert et al. (1997); Agranoff and McGuire (2001)
----------------------------	--	--	--

(Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016)

## D. INHOUDELIJKE DIMENSIES

Allerhande uitdagingen volgens de praktijk:

- Strategie
  - Management
  - Prestaties
  - Macht
  - Structuur
  - Multi-actor proces & de menselijke factor
  - Omgeving
  - Temporele component
- => uitdieping doorheen semester & in groepsopdracht

## NOG MEE?

- Ga met laptop of smartphone naar  
[app.gosoapbox.com](http://app.gosoapbox.com)
- Vul de code in die in de les gegeven wordt



# 4. NETWERKEN IN DRIE SOORTEN COMPLEXITEIT ONTRAFELD



=> Zie ook HST, 3, 4, 5

47

## NETWERKMANAGEMENT = MANAGEN VAN COMPLEXITEIT IN GOVERNANCE NETWORKS

Drie soorten complexiteit:

(1) Substantive complexity  $\approx$  INHOUD

(2) Strategic complexity  $\approx$  PROCES

(3) Institutional complexity  $\approx$  STRUCTUUR & REGELS



Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016

48

# A. SUBSTANTIVE COMPLEXITY IN GOVERNANCE NETWORKS

## HOE 'WICKED' ZIJN PROBLEMEN?

Table 3.1 Four types of problems

(Societal) agreement on problem formulation	Certainty on (scientific) knowledge	
	Large	Little
<b>Large</b>	Type 1 Technical problems	Untamed technical problems Type 2
<b>Little</b>	Type 3 Political problems	Wicked problems Type 4

Source: Hoppe (2010: 16).

# SUBSTANTIVE COMPLEXITY? PROBEER EVEN ZELF

## Inhoud

### – Duurzame mobiliteit?



De werkdagen worden steeds langer doordat we allemaal twee keer per dag in de file staan, maar het openbaar vervoer is alleen nog erger.


Met de stijgende brandstofprijzen en parkeerkosten wordt de extra kost voor uitstapjes wel erg groot.

Nieuwe infrastructuur aanleggen helpt niets tegen de files: het zuigt toch alleen maar nieuw verkeer aan.

1. Wat veroorzaakt de verkeersknoop en wat kost die ons? – 9
  2. Welke voertuigen en waarom? – 31
  3. Hoe kunnen we onze bestaande infrastructuur beter gebruiken? – 51
  4. Wat is er mis met de alternatieven voor de auto? – 79
  5. Hoe kunnen we onze ruimte beter organiseren? – 91
  6. Waarheen met ons wegennet? – 113
  7. Hoe nemen we nu verstandige mobiliteitsbeslissingen? – 135
- Nawoord – 145  
Referenties – 151

51

## OORZAAK 1: BELANG VAN PERCEPTIE?



52

## PROBEER EVEN ZELF




Figure 3.1 Multiple perceptions of a problem situation

UNIVERSITY

(Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016)

53

## VB. GENTSE KANAALZONE

– <http://gentsekanaalzone.be/>



GHENT  
UNIVERSITY



54

## “FRAMING & NAMING THE PROBLEM”

= “selecteren, organiseren, interpreteren en begrijpen van een complexe realiteit die richtlijnen geven voor weten, analyseren, overtuigen en handelen” (Rein & Schön 1992 in Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016:50)

Leidende ‘principes’:

- Dramatisering & personalisering
- Gebruik facts & figures
- Nieuw en dringend
- Culturele aanvaardbaarheid
- Politieke correctheid en economische relevantie
- Actiegericht en toegewijd



## PERCEPTIES WIJZIGEN? FRAME SELECTION & REFRAMING

- Percepties zijn taai = geworteld in waardensystemen
- Policy coalitions = “groepen van actoren binnen een subsysteem of netwerk die ene waardensysteem delen” (Sabatier, 1988, in Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016:54).

MAAR:

Percepties kunnen wijzigen => frame reflection & reframing

Q: Oorzaken?



WAT ALS DE ECONOMIE  
EEN DONUT WAS?

DEBAT  
1 OKTOBER  
GENT  
Rethinking  
Economics



## OORZAAK 2: INFORMATIE & KENNIS

- Response type 1: complexiteit = probleem van gebrekkige kennis van feiten => data verzamelen, experten betrekken, onderzoek laten uitvoeren ('neo-positivistisch') => "evidence-based policy"



57

## OORZAAK 2: INFORMATIE & KENNIS

- Response type 2: contra-expertise = "elk zijn studie"

### ***"Tegenstrijdige rapporten over beschikbaarheid zwavelarme brandstof"***

*Twee studies naar de beschikbaarheid van zwavelarme scheepsbrandstof tegen 2020, wanneer de zwavellimiet van 0,5% van kracht wordt, spreken elkaar tegen. De IMO zegt dat er voldoende zal zijn, BIMCO en de oliesector geloven van niet. (Flows, 11.08.2016)*


Q: oplossing?

58


## VB. OOSTERWEEL

- <http://www.ademloos.be/factchecker>
- <http://www.ademloos.be/onderzoek>
- <http://www.ademloos.be/mer>

## LEESVOER (OPTIONEEL)



## KENNISPRODUCTIE & INTERACTIEPROCES



## WICKED PROBLEM = RESPONSE TYPE 3?

- Bewustzijn & aanvaarding van ≠ percepties & waarden
- Gezamenlijke kennisopbouw in het netwerk via gezamenlijke interactie met netwerkactoren



## COMPLEX OF GECOMPLICEERD?

Table 3.2 Complicated versus complex problems

	<i>The content of problems</i>	
	<i>Complicated problems</i>	<i>Complex problems</i>
Source of complicatedness and complexity 1	Many actors present, system involves many components	Presence of diverging and conflicting values and perceptions about problems and their solutions
Source of complicatedness and complexity 2	Lack of information and knowledge about causal relations in a problem situation	Information overload, confusion, and knowledge conflicts
Adequate response	Information gathering, use of experts, conducting research	Joint production of meaning

## B. STRATEGIC COMPLEXITY IN GOVERNANCE NETWORKS

## PROBLEEM?

- $\neq$  actoren  $\Rightarrow \neq$  percepties  $\Rightarrow \neq$  acties & strategieën EN veranderen tijdens het proces ('non-lineair')
- Strategische complexiteit = hoe krijgt het governance netwerk vorm als een proces en hoe komen er beslissingen tot stand?

## VB. INTEGRALE JEUGDHULP

*“Jordy stierf 3 jaar geleden in tentje in Gent, ex-begeleidster:  
“Maatschappij laat jongeren op dool nog steeds vallen””* (deredactie.be,  
27.09.2019)

*“Hoe het kon dat Jordy alleen in een tentje eindigde. Goede gast,  
geboren voor het ongeluk”* (DM, 03.09.2016)

*“Instelling treft geen schuld aan tragische dood Jordy”* (DM, 01.10.2016)

*“Ook meerderjarige moet op jeugdhulp kunnen rekenen”* (DM,  
13.03.2017)

## EVEN TERUG IN DE TIJD: HET FASENMODEL

Table 4.1 A phase model of policymaking

- 1 Formulate the problem
- 2 Analyze the problem situation
- 3 Identify alternatives for solving problems
- 4 Set goals and priorities
- 5 Compare costs and benefits of alternatives
- 6 Make a selection from the alternatives
- 7 Implement solution (and delivering services)
- 8 Monitor and control implementation of solution
- 9 Evaluate

Table 4.2 Policymaking as an analytical activity versus a social interaction process

	<i>Problem solving as intellectual design</i>	<i>Problem solving as strategic game</i>
Policymaking	An intellectual design process that is sometimes interrupted by political considerations	A political power game that is dominated by strategic considerations
Perspective	Central actor who solves problems in relative autonomy and whose problem perception is taken as the starting point for analysis and design	Mutually dependent actors who pursue a solution through negotiation and strife
Processes	Sequential processes that can be subdivided into phases or steps with a clear beginning and end	Zigzag and erratic processes in which information, means, and objectives are exchanged and a collective outcome is achieved in an incremental manner
Decision	A scientifically grounded answer to a well-defined problem, in which appropriate means are sought on the basis of a given objective	A political compromise where problems are sometimes found to fit existing solutions, and the available means co-determine the choice of objectives
Uncertainties	Arise from a lack of knowledge and information about the nature of the problem and solutions	Come from the behaviour of actors as grounded in their interests, positions, and preferences
Information	Emphasis on scientific knowledge gathering; knowledge use leads to better problem solving	Selectively used to support partisan arguments
Criterion for success	Decreasing the gap between the problem situation and criterion; achievement of objectives formulated ex ante	Improving the position of those involved when compared with the existing situation
Fail factors	Lack of information about causal relations; lack of a clear framework for appraisal; inadequate planning, lack of resources; too many actors involved	Inadequate processes of interaction and information exchange so that mutual solutions are not developed
Prescriptions	More information and research; clarification and prioritization of objectives; tighter planning and centralization; limiting and structuring participation	Improvement of conditions for cooperation and joint image building through facilitation, mediation, and arbitration

## STRATEGIC COMPLEXITY

- 1) ACTOREN
- 2) HULPBRONNEN (vijf types)
- 3) (ONDERLINGE) AFHANKELIJKHEDEN => MACHT
- 4) PERCEPTIES & STRATEGIEEN

(cfr. eerdere definitie)

## AFHANKELIJK? WIE VOOR WAT?

Table 4.3 Typology of dependency relations between actors

<i>Importance of the resource</i>	<i>Substitutability of the resource</i>	
	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
Great	Moderate dependency	High dependency
Small	Low dependency	Moderate dependency




Figure 4.1 Strategies as goal–means combinations based on perceptions

## DE ENE ACTIE IS DE ANDERE NIET

- 1) Go-alone
- 2) Coalition-building
- 3) Conflictual
- 4) Avoidance
- 5) Cooperative or collaborative
- 6) factilitating

## BELANG VAN ARENA'S



## VOORUITGANG IN RONDES (IPV FASEN)




Figure 4.2 The policy game as a mix of strategies (game types) that actors bring to the arena

Source: Koppenjan and Klijn (2004: 50).

## VOORUITGANG IN RONDES (IPV FASEN)





Figure 4.3 Rounds in the governance network process

Source: Koppenjan and Klijn (2004: 61).

## VB. GENTSE KANAALZONE

Figure 11: Discerning rounds in PGK



## MEERVOUDIGE PROCESSEN




Figure 4.4 The governance network process as interactions in various arenas  
Source: Koppenjan and Klijn (2004: 57).

(Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016)

77

## VOORUITGANG = KOPPELEN VAN 'SPELLEN'




Figure 4.5 The coupling between arenas and processes  
Source: Koppenjan and Klijn (2004: 59).

(Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016)

78



# C. THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY OF GOVERNANCE NETWORKS: PATTERNS, RULES & TRUST

## ARENA'S, REGELS & INTERACTIEPATRONEN

Table 5.1 Institutional and process characteristics of networks

<i>Dynamics</i>		<i>When/how</i>
<b>Institutional characteristics</b>		
Rules	Small, changes normally take a lot of time	Actors commonly share generalizable procedures, codes, etc. Rules change only slowly over time since multiple actors must accept the changes. Rules are, in principle, the most stable element of the network. They only change rapidly in situations of crisis or major turbulence in the networks
Interaction patterns	Gradual	Emerge through regularity of contacts between actors in games (accumulation of all games in network between actors), change gradually with the interaction choices of actors in games
Perception patterns	Gradual	Result of individual actor perceptions, but can develop through interactions between actors (convergence or divergence of perceptions)
<b>Process characteristics</b>		
Game	Relatively dynamic	Confrontation of different strategies of actors in arenas. Games are highly dynamic because confrontations or strategies may have many consequences, as do the strategic reactions of actors to confrontation. Thus, there is a continuous dynamic of events, actor responses, outcomes, etc.
Actor perception	Gradual change and adaptation	Perceptions of actors are shaped and changed through their experiences. They display a fair degree of stability but change as a consequence of the learning experience of actors (dissatisfaction with the process, contact with other ideas, etc.)
Actor strategy	Very dynamic	Actors quickly adapt their strategies, because of the behaviour of other actors, dissatisfaction with results, or changed goals or perceptions. The most dynamic element of networks in the game

(Klijn &amp; Koppenjan, 2016)

## INSTITUTIONALISME? – EVEN OPFRISSEN

Table 5.2 Two logics of action

	<i>Logic of consequences</i>	<i>Logic of appropriateness</i>
Need for knowledge	What are my alternatives? (strategic analysis)	What kind of a situation is this? (situational analysis)
Values	What are my values? (goals)	Who am I? (identity)
Considerations	What are the consequences of alternatives to my values? (means–ends analysis)	How appropriate are different actions for me in this situation?
Choices	Choose the alternative that has the best consequences	Do what is most appropriate

Source: Adapted from March and Olsen (1989: 23).

## INSTITUTIONALISME? – EVEN OPFRISSEN

Table 5.3 Types of institutional theory

	<i>Regulative theories</i>	<i>Normative theories</i>	<i>Cognitive theories</i>
Basis for compliance	Expedience	Social obligation	Taken for granted
Mechanisms for creation and maintenance	Coercive	Normative	Mimetic
Action logic	Instrumentality	Appropriateness	Orthodoxy (generally accepted)
Indicators	Laws, sanctions	Certification, accreditation	Prevalence, isomorphism
Basis of legitimacy	Legally sanctioned	Morally governed	Culturally supported, conceptually correct

Source: Adapted from Scott (1995: 35).

(Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016)

## SOORTEN REGELS

Table 5.4 Types of rules in networks

Description	Aspects	Examples
<b>Interaction rules</b>		
Rules that regulate game interactions (Rules that specify what is and what is not allowed in games between actors)	Access to policy games	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exclusiveness</li> <li>• Selection</li> <li>• Exit opportunities</li> <li>• (Non)intervention</li> </ul>
	Interaction in policy games	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Information provision</li> <li>• Conflict</li> </ul>
<b>Network rules</b>		
Rules that regulate the setting of the game (Rules that define the social practices and distinguish important matters from unimportant ones)	Reality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identity of actors</li> <li>• Product rules</li> </ul>
	Reward	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Status</li> </ul>
	Positions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evaluation criteria</li> <li>• Competencies</li> </ul>

Source: Klijn (2001).

## HET BELANG VAN VERTROUWEN



- Reductie transactiekosten
  - Beter investeren in & meer stabiele relaties
  - Leren en kennisuitwisseling stimuleren
  - Innovatie stimuleren
- => Vertrouwen als voorwaarde voor & als resultaat van governance netwerken

## BEINVLOEDENDE FACTOREN VERTROUWEN

- Eerdere interacties
- Reputatie van andere actoren
- Verwachtingen over toekomstige voordelen
- Aanwezigheid en aard van bindende netwerkregels

## 5. TOT SLOT


## PRAKTIJK AAN HET WOORD: UITDAGINGEN MBT NETWERKEN? (1/2)

- Organisatiestructuur (vb. veelheid overlegplatformen)
- Weigering medewerking van anderen
- Interne politieke spelletjes
- Spanning autonomie-aansturing
- Hoe het netwerk versterken?
- Gemeenschappelijke scope & objectieven identificeren
- Voldoende informatie-uitwisseling organiseren

## PRAKTIJK AAN HET WOORD: UITDAGINGEN MBT NETWERKEN? (2/2)

- Bevoegdheden & verantwoordelijkheden
- Regisseren & motiveren
- Verschillende beleidsopvattingen
- Kost veel tijd (uitbouw & onderhouden)
- Verschillende timing
- Verborgene agenda's
- Geen budget
- Stroomlijning diensten
- Andere, nl...

## VOORBEELD:

- Samenwerken in de context van ouderenzorg 
- Kijkvragen:
  - 1) Welke kenmerken van samenwerking komen aan bod?
  - 2) Welke actoren komen aan bod?
  - 3) Welke kritische succes- en faalfactoren komen aan bod?



## NA VANDAAG...

- Weet u waar samenwerking en netwerken vandaan komt en wat die trend inhoudt
- Kunt u aangeven waarom zoal samengewerkt wordt en dat concreet illustreren
- Kunt u het nodige reliëf in vormen en types van samenwerking in netwerken onderscheiden
- Kunt u het voorgaande met concrete voorbeelden illustreren
- Kunt u samenwerking ook kritisch bekijken en bespreken
- Kunt u samenwerking in netwerken in de ruimere bestuurskundige literatuur situeren
- Bent u in staat om de drie complexiteiten uit te leggen en de brug te leggen naar het managen ervan

## WERK NU AL VERDER DOOR

- Deel I van het boek te lezen
- De cursus en lessen te verbinden met de groepsopdracht